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abstract: Hawk-dove games have been extensively used to predict
the conditions under which group-living animals should defend their
resources against potential usurpers. Typically, game-theoretic models
on aggression consider that resource defense may entail energetic
and injury costs. However, intruders may also take advantage of
owners who are busy fighting to sneak access to unguarded resources,
imposing thereby an additional cost on the use of the escalated hawk
strategy. In this article we modify the two-strategy hawk-dove game
into a three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game that incorporates a
distraction-sneaking tactic, allowing us to explore its consequences
on the expected level of aggression within groups. Our model predicts
a lower proportion of hawks and hence lower frequencies of ag-
gressive interactions within groups than do previous two-strategy
hawk-dove games. The extent to which distraction sneakers decrease
the frequency of aggression within groups, however, depends on
whether they search only for opportunities to join resources uncov-
ered by other group members or for both unchallenged resources
and opportunities to usurp.
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game-theoretic model.
* Corresponding author; e-mail: frede_dubois@yahoo.fr.
† E-mail: giraldeau.luc-alain@uqam.ca.




Am. Nat. 2004. Vol. 164, pp. E32–E45. 2004 by The University of Chicago.
0003-0147/2004/16402-40157$15.00. All rights reserved.
When animals live in groups, they must frequently decide
whether to defend resources against potential usurpers.
Defense may be energetically costly (Puckett and Dill 1985)
and entail risk of injury or death from aggressive inter-
actions (Enquist et al. 1990) or predators (Martel and Dill
1995). Another potential cost of defense is that owners
may be taken advantage of while engaged in defense
(sometimes called “aggressive neglect”; Wilson 1975). In-
truders may take advantage of owners who are busy fight-
ing or chasing neighbors or intruders to sneak into the
unguarded food patch (Chapman and Kramer 1996; Ham-
ilton and Dill 2003a) or to court an unguarded female
(Grant et al. 1995). Such intruders may synchronize their
approach with other intruders (surgeonfish: Barlow 1974;
Foster 1985) or even recruit other intruders (juvenile ra-
vens: Marzluff and Heinrich 1991) to overwhelm the de-
fense of resource owners. We call these sneakers “distrac-
tion sneakers” because they take advantage of the resource
owner’s involvement in an alternative activity in order to
gain access to the resource that is temporarily left un-
guarded. Distraction sneakers can have important effects
on the level of aggression within groups because they im-
pose a cost of lost resources on aggressive resource defense
or appropriation over and above the usual energetic and
injury costs that are typically considered by optimality
models (Brown 1964; Emlen and Oring 1977; Myers et al.
1981; Grant 1993).
Distraction sneaking is one of a suite of tactics, collec-
tively referred to in the literature as “sneaking,” that in-
volve the use of stealth, speed, mimicry, or distraction to
avoid receiving aggression from defending resource own-
ers. Such sneaking appears to be ubiquitous and exhibits
considerable variability. In some cases, sneaking and ter-
ritoriality are employed by different individuals. For ex-
ample, in the bluegill sunfish (Lepomis macrochirus) large
males build nests and defend territories whereas smaller
males hide nearby and use a sneaker strategy to approach
nests and spawn with females (Gross 1984). Similarly, adult
ravens (Corvus corax) defend carcasses, whereas immature
ravens sneak in large groups to acquire food (Marzluff and
Heinrich 1991). In other systems, many individuals use a
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combination of sneaking and resource defense (O¨stlund-
Nilsson 2002; for an example in a foraging system with
distraction sneakers, see Hamilton and Dill 2003b). The-
oretical models have considered the ecological factors that
affect the frequency of sneakers (but not sneakers that take
advantage of aggressive interactions) within populations
(Gross 1984, 1996; Repka and Gross 1995) and on the
tactics that may be employed by sneakers (i.e., whether to
invade alongside or following other sneakers or to assist
territory holders in defense; Hamilton and Dill 2002,
2003a). However, little attention has been directed to the
issue of how the presence of sneakers affects the expected
levels of aggression within groups. In this study we in-
vestigate the consequence of including distraction sneakers
in analyses of the economics of resource defense.
The hawk-dove game is perhaps the most general ap-
proach to modeling aggressive interactions over resources
(Maynard Smith and Price 1973). This game can take sym-
metric or asymmetric forms, depending on whether in-
dividuals play distinct roles (e.g., defender and intruder
or finder and joiner; Dubois et al. 2003). Thus it can be
tailored both to territorial systems with relatively per-
manent resource locations, in which there is a distinction
between territory owners and intruders, and nonterritorial
systems with ephemeral resource locations where such
asymmetries may or may not be present (Giraldeau and
Caraco 2000). The hawk-dove game is often analyzed as
a two-player game where individuals meet in pairs (e.g.,
Sirot 2000; Dubois et al. 2003). When groups of animals
compete for local clumps of resources, however, interac-
tions often take the form of n-person scrambles. Hence
in this article, we modify the two-player hawk-dove game
into an n-player scramble hawk-dove-sneaker game that
incorporates a distraction-sneaking tactic to investigate the
ecological conditions that favor this tactic and explore its
consequences on the expected level of aggression within
groups. The success of distraction sneakers as a resource
exploitation strategy depends on the frequency of aggres-
sion initiated by other group members. We expect the
sneaker strategy, therefore, to have negative frequency-
dependent success; distraction sneakers will have high fit-
ness when they are rare and aggression is common in the
population, and they will have low fitness when they are
frequent and aggression is rare.
The Model
For this model we will consider a foraging scenario, but
the general conclusions should hold for any resource that
can be exploited simultaneously by more than one indi-
vidual. We hypothesize a group of ( ) foragers. WhenG 1
an animal finds a clump of food containing F items, all
remaining G group members become intruders and con-
gregate to appropriate the finder’s resource. The resource
finder always gets a secure fraction of a resource (a) which,
following Vickery et. al. (1991), we call the “finder’s ad-
vantage.” Once the joiners arrive at the patch, the finder’s
advantage has been consumed, and what is left ( )F a
will be termed the “joiner’s share” (Vickery et al. 1991).
Animals can use one of the three appropriation strategies:
hawk, dove, or sneaker. The parameters p, q, and r denote
the frequency of each strategy within the whole group,
with . Although we will relax this assump-p q rp 1
tion later, for now we assume that hawks and doves search
for food but that sneakers never search and that they rely
on resources uncovered by other group members. There-
fore, only individuals playing hawk or dove can obtain the
finder’s advantage, and their probability of discovering
resources does not depend on the strategy they use.
Whereas hawks use force to chase the other competitors
and gain exclusive access to the remaining resource, both
dove and sneaker players use a nonaggressive strategy and
share the resource with any other group member that tol-
erates them. If at least one of the individuals at the patch
plays hawk, whether owner or intruder, doves retreat and
leave the joiner’s share behind. A sneaker, however, gains
some fraction of the joiner’s share by feeding while the
hawks are busy fighting. We assume that animals do not
differ in their fighting abilities such that all animals that
use the hawk strategy have the same probability of winning
the joiner’s share.
Unlike earlier hawk-dove games, hawks in our game are
not injured. Instead the escalated fights involve both time
and energetic costs that vary according to the number of
competitors playing hawk at the patch (Dubois et al. 2003).
In particular, we consider that the time and energetic cost
of fighting are t and c, respectively, when an animal has
to chase only one opponent from the patch. Conversely,
when the patch is contested by pG other competitors play-
ing hawk, the time spent fighting is , and theTp pGt
energetic cost C is proportional to the duration of the
fights such that . When they are not engaged inCp Tc
any other activities, animals obtain x units of resource per
time unit. So, during a time T, each animal playing sneaker
can potentially obtain xT units of resource. For simplicity’s
sake, we assume that x is smaller than . Thus,24(F a)/tG
whatever the proportion of animals playing sneaker or
hawk, the patch is never completely depleted because the
aggressive contestants cease fighting, and the quantity of
remaining resource obtained by the winner of the fights
is then Q, with
Qp (F a) xTrG, (1)
where is the total duration of the fights and rTp pGt
the proportion of animals playing sneaker.
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The sneakers have a probability b of being still present
on the patch as the winner of the fights returns to the
patch to feed. In this case, they are attacked by the vic-
torious contestant and suffer an energetic cost c.
To simplify the analysis, we ignore simultaneous patch
discoveries and assume that patch discovery is rare and
occurs sequentially. We assume that the time required for
an individual foraging alone to detect a food patch is tS.
In a group of G foragers, however, the time before a food
patch is discovered equals , where i ( )itp t /G 0 ≤ i ≤ 1S
determines how the searching contribution of an individ-
ual changes as a function of foraging group size. According
to this equation, the time required for an individual to
detect a food patch is not affected by being in the group
when but decreases with increasing group size whenip 0
. Moreover, we consider that patch exploitation timei 1 0
is negligible when there is only one forager on the patch
but that the addition of competitors increases the time
required to deplete a patch through interference compe-
tition. Thus, when the finder and the joiners all play either
dove or sneaker, the exploitation time of the patch is
, where a corresponds to the level of in-T p a(G 1)E
terference that depends among other parameters on patch
size. We express the mean payoff of each strategy as the
mean number of food items gained by an individual in a
patch divided by the time it spent searching and exploiting
the patch, including the time spent in fights. Hence the
average rate of energy intake of an animal playing hawk
is
a Q
W p   Tc (t  T). (2)H [ ]Z1 (p q)G 1 pG
Given that an animal playing dove leaves the patch when
at least one competitor plays hawk, its average rate of
energy intake is
a F a




W p t if p 1 0. (3b)D [ ]Z1 (p q)G
Similarly, an animal playing sneaker shares the contested
resource with the other competitors if none of them be-
haves aggressively; otherwise, it races to gain access to as
much of the resource as possible while the animals playing
hawk are engaged in fights. Thus the expected gain of an
animal playing sneaker is
F a
W p (t  T ) if pp 0, (4a)S E( )Z1 G
or
xT bc
W if p 1 0. (4b)Dp
t T
Analysis
Playing hawk is the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if
the expected gain of an animal playing hawk is greater
than the gain expected by an animal playing any alternative
strategy when the other G group members play hawk (i.e.,
). Solving and requires ∗pp 1 W 1 W W 1 W c ! cH D H S 1
and , with∗c ! c 2
1 F a a∗c p #  , (5)1 ( ) ( )1 G Gt t
1 F∗c p #  xtG . (6)2 ( ) ( )tG b 1 G
When the cost of fighting is smaller than the threshold
values and , neither dove nor sneaker can invade a∗ ∗c c1 2
group in which all individuals play hawk, and hence hawk
is the ESS. Conversely, when the G intruders all play dove
(i.e., ), the quantity of resource expected to be gainedqp 1
by an animal is always greater if it plays hawk because the
doves leave the patch as soon as one competitor plays
hawk, thereby allowing the aggressive animal to get the
whole joiner’s share at no cost. As a consequence, playing
dove is never the ESS. Neither can playing sneaker be the
ESS because this strategy never searches for food.
When hawk cannot resist against the invasion of at least
one alternative strategy (i.e., when and/or ),∗ ∗c 1 c c 1 c1 2
the solution of the game is a mixed strategy .∗ ∗ ∗{p , q , r }
However, three different situations can occur, depending
on whether hawk can coexist with only one alternative
strategy ( or ) or with both dove and∗ ∗q p 0 r p 0
sneaker. We consider each in turn.
Hawk and Dove but No Sneaker
The mixed ESS is and hence the expected∗ ∗{p , 1 p , 0}
proportion of animals playing sneaker at equilibrium r∗
is equal to 0 if when and the proportionW ! W rp 0S D
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of animals playing hawk is such that the expected gain of
an animal playing hawk equals that of an animal playing
dove. When the proportion of animals playing sneaker is
equal to 0, the condition is satisfied ifW p WH D
a F a a
  Tc (t  T )p t. (7)( ) ( )Z Z1 G 1 pG 1 G
Solving equation (7) requires that the proportion of an-
imals playing hawk is p∗, with
tw tw# [tw 4t(F a)(1 G)]
∗p p , (8)
2Gtw
with . When the proportion of animalswp a tc(1 G)
playing hawk and dove are p∗ and , respectively, the∗1 p
expected gain of an animal playing sneaker is smaller than
that of an animal playing dove if the cost of fighting is
greater than the critical value , with∗c 3
∗1 a(t p Gt)∗ ∗c p # p Gtx . (9)3 [ ]b t(1 G)
Hawk and Sneaker but No Dove
The mixed ESS is , and hence the expected∗ ∗{p , 0, 1 p }
proportion of animals playing dove at equilibrium q∗ is
equal to 0 if when , and the proportionW ! W qp 0D S
of animals playing hawk is such that the expected gain of
an animal playing hawk equals that of an animal playing
sneaker. When the proportion of animals playing dove is
equal to 0, the condition is satisfied ifW p WH S
a Q xT bc
  Tc (t  T)p . (10)( )Z1 pG 1 pG t T
Solving equation (10) requires that the proportion of an-
imals playing hawk is p∗, with
c(b t) tx(1 G) N
∗p p , (11)
2Gtc
where . When2Np 4tc(F cb) [c(t b) tx(1 G)]
the proportions of animals playing hawk and sneaker are
and r∗, respectively, the expected gain of an animal∗1 r
playing dove is smaller than that of an animal playing
sneaker provided that the cost of fighting is smaller than
the critical value , with∗c4
∗1 a(t p Gt)∗ ∗c p # p Gtx . (12)4 ∗[ ]b t(1 p G)
Hawk, Dove, and Sneaker
When the cost of fighting is smaller than but greater∗c 3
than , the three strategies coexist within the population,∗c4
and the expected proportions of each strategy at equilib-
rium {p∗, q∗, r∗} satisfy the following condition: W pH
.W p WD S
From these results, we can define the solution of the
game according to the loss of energy associated with fight-
ing c :
When and , neither dove nor sneaker can∗ ∗c ! c c ! c1 2
invade a group in which all individuals play hawk and
the ESS is {1, 0, 0}.
When and/or , , and , hawk and∗ ∗ ∗ ∗c 1 c c 1 c c 1 c c 1 c1 2 3 4
dove coexist within the population and the ESS is
, with the expression of p∗ given by equa-∗ ∗{p , 1 p , 0}
tion (8).
When and/or , , and , hawk and∗ ∗ ∗ ∗c 1 c c 1 c c ! c c ! c1 2 3 4
sneaker coexist within the population and the ESS is
, with the expression of r∗ given by equa-∗ ∗{1 r , 0, r }
tion (11).
When and/or , , and , hawk, dove,∗ ∗ ∗ ∗c 1 c c 1 c c ! c c 1 c1 2 3 4
and sneaker coexist within the population, and the fre-
quencies of each strategy at equilibrium {p∗, q∗, r∗} sat-
isfy .W p W p WH D S
Predictions
The model predicts that hawk is the only appropriation
strategy that can never reach 0 frequency at equilibrium.
Thus, there is no condition in which group members
should all use nonaggressive appropriation strategies. The
likelihood that all-hawk is the ESS appropriation strategy
increases as the number of intruders competing for the
patch decreases (fig. 1A). When the number of intruders
is low, the time spent fighting and the cumulative energetic
cost associated with fighting are both very low. Thus, a
sneaker mutant could exploit the patch only during a very
short time, and the quantity of resource it would obtain
would be insufficient to allow it to invade a group of
hawks. Similarly, when the number of intruders in the
group is low, each intruder has a high probability of success
in chasing the other intruders and hence of obtaining the
joiner’s share at a relatively low cost. The benefits of de-
fending are then greater than the costs of fighting, which
prevents dove from invading a hawk population. In con-
trast, when the number of intruders is large, the time and
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Figure 1: Expected frequencies of hawk, dove, and sneaker in relation to the number of competitors when sneakers search only for opportunities
to join resources uncovered by other group members (A) or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp (B). In this figure, Fp
, , , , , , , .10 ap 2 cp 1 tp 1 bp 0.5 xp 1 t p 2 ip 0.2S
energy required to chase the intruders out of the patch
increase. So the model predicts that increasing the number
of intruders will decrease the proportion of aggressive an-
imals (p∗) but increase the frequency of both dove (q∗)
and sneaker (r∗).
When the energetic costs of fighting are very low, the
model predicts that the proportion of animals playing dove
should be very low because then the joiner’s share is very
large relative to the energetic cost of fighting, and the
sneaker should dominate the population. When the en-
ergetic value of the resource exceeds the energetic cost of
aggression (low c), intruders have an incentive to fight for
the resource. However, when all intruders play hawk, the
time spent in fights increases such that sneakers can obtain
a larger fraction of the joiner’s share, leaving insufficient
resources for the returning victorious hawk to cover the
costs it expended while fighting. Increasing the energetic
cost c leads to an increase in the proportion of animals
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Figure 2: Expected frequencies of hawk, dove, and sneaker in relation to the energetic cots of fighting when sneakers search only for opportunities
to join resources uncovered by other group members (A) or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp (B). In this figure, Gp
, , , , , , , .6 Fp 10 ap 2 tp 1 bp 0.5 xp 1 t p 0.9 ip 0.2S
playing dove but, surprisingly, has little effect on the fre-
quency of hawk. As the proportion of animals playing
hawk decreases, the cumulative costs of fighting all other
hawks decreases, while the expected cost of fighting for
sneakers does not depend on the average strategy adopted
by the other group members. Therefore, as the energetic
cost c increases, we predict that animals should reduce
their use of the sneaker strategy, leading to an increase in
the quantity of resource that can be gained by the winner
of the fights. Thus, not only the costs but also the benefits
of aggressive appropriation increase as the energetic ex-
penditure caused by each contest increases. This is the
reason why variations in the energetic cost of contests have
no marked influence on the expected frequency of hawk
(fig. 2A).
When the mean duration of contests is short, most in-
dividuals should play hawk (fig. 3A). When this is so, the
quantity of resource that can be gained by an animal play-
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Figure 3: Expected frequencies of hawk, dove, and sneaker in relation to the mean duration of contest when sneakers search only for opportunities
to join resources uncovered by other group members (A) or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp (B). In this figure, Gp
, , , , , , , .6 Fp 10 ap 2 cp 1 bp 0.5 xp 1 t p 0.9 ip 0.2S
ing sneaker is relatively small, particularly if patches de-
plete slowly (low x). Moreover, when the mean contest
duration is short, the time required to detect food patches
is very large in relation to the time spent fighting, partic-
ularly if food density is small (large t), and a large pro-
portion of animals are then expected to compete aggres-
sively. Increasing the mean duration of contests leads to
an increase in the amount of resource that can be gained
by an animal playing sneaker, but it also leads to a decrease
in the value of the remaining resource that can be gained
by an animal playing hawk. However, when the mean
contest duration becomes very long, the time required to
chase the intruders out of the patch is likely to exceed the
time required to uncover an equivalent replacement food
patch. Consequently, increasing the mean duration of con-
tests is predicted to increase the proportion of animals
playing both dove and sneaker but decrease the proportion
of animals playing hawk (fig. 3A).
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Figure 4: Expected frequencies of hawk, dove, and sneaker in relation to patch richness when sneakers search only for opportunities to join resources
uncovered by other group members (A) or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp (B). In this figure, , , ,Gp 6 ap 2 cp 1
, , , , .tp 1 bp 0.5 xp 1 t p 2 ip 0.2S
The use of the nonaggressive dove strategy is predicted
to decline as F, patch richness, increases (fig. 4A). When
patches are poor (low F), the joiner’s share is unlikely to
be sufficient to cover the costs of fighting. For this reason,
only a small proportion of animals should play hawk.
Moreover, given that the proportion of aggressive en-
counters and the time spent in fights are very low when
the frequency of hawk at equilibrium is small, the potential
gain as a sneaker is low. When patches are rich, on the
other hand, the benefits of defending are increased. In-
creasing patch richness, therefore, should lead to an in-
crease in the proportion of intruders playing either hawk
or sneaker but also to a decrease in the proportion of
animals playing dove. Similarly, the frequency of dove
should be maximal when the finder’s advantage (a) is large
and hence the joiner’s share is insufficient to cover the
cost of fighting. Decreasing the finder’s advantage, con-
versely, should increase the frequency of both hawk and
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sneaker but also decrease the proportion of animals play-
ing dove.
Allowing Sneakers to Search for
Unchallenged Resources
In the previous game, only hawks and doves could find
resources. We now relax this assumption and allow sneak-
ers to also find resources. All other elements of the game
remain unchanged. Under these conditions, the expected
gain of an animal playing hawk after t time units becomes
a Q
W p   Tc (t  T), (13)H ( )Z1 G 1 pG
where Q is the quantity of the remaining resource obtained
by the winner of the fights and whose expression is given
by equation (1).
However, the gain expected by an animal playing dove
after t time units is
F
W p (t  T ) if pp 0, (14a)D E( )Z1 G
or
a
W p t if p 1 0, (14b)ZD ( )1 G
whereas the expected gain of an animal playing sneaker
becomes
F
W p t if pp 0, (15a)S ( )Z1 G
a
W p  xT bc (t  T) if p 1 0. (15b)S ( )Z1 G
Analysis
Playing hawk is the only ESS intruder strategy when the
expected gain of an animal playing hawk is greater than
the gain expected by an animal playing any alternative
strategy if the other G group members play hawk (i.e.,
). Solving and requires ∗pp 1 W 1 W W 1 W c ! cH D H S 5
and , with∗c ! c6
1 F a a∗c p #  , (16)5 ( ) ( )1 G Gt t
1 F a∗c p #  xGt . (17)6 ( ) ( )Gt b 1 G
When the cost of fighting is smaller than the threshold
values and , neither dove nor sneaker can invade a∗ ∗c c5 6
group in which all individuals play hawk, and hence hawk
is the only ESS, and all intruders should use escalated
aggressive appropriation. Conversely, when the G intruders
all play either dove or sneaker (i.e., or ), theqp 1 rp 1
amount of resource expected to be gained by an animal
is always greater if it plays hawk rather than dove or
sneaker. As a consequence, neither all dove nor all sneaker
can be ESS solutions to the game.
When hawk cannot resist against the invasion of at least
one alternative strategy (i.e., when and/or ),∗ ∗c 1 c c 1 c5 6
the solution of the game is a mixed strategy {p∗, q∗, r∗},
but three different situations can occur, depending on
whether hawk can coexist with only one alternative strat-
egy ( or ) or with both dove and sneaker.∗ ∗q p 0 r p 0
Hawk and Dove but No Sneaker
The mixed ESS is , and hence the expected∗ ∗{p , 1 p , 0}
proportion of animals playing sneaker at equilibrium r∗
is equal to 0 if when and the proportionW ! W rp 0S D
of animals playing hawk is such that the expected gain of
an animal playing hawk equals that of an animal playing
dove. When the proportion of animals playing sneaker is
equal to 0, the condition is satisfied ifW p WH D
a F a a
  cT (t T)p t. (18)( ) ( )Z Z1 G 1 pG 1 G
Solving equation (18) requires that the proportion of an-
imals playing hawk is p∗, with
tw tw# [tw 4t(F a)(1 G)]
∗p p , (19)
2Gtw
where . When the proportion of ani-wp a tc(1 G)
mals playing hawk and dove are p∗ and , respectively,∗1 p
the expected gain of an animal playing sneaker is smaller
than that of an animal playing dove if the cost of fighting
is greater than the critical value , with∗c 7
∗p Gt a∗c p # x . (20)7 ( ) [ ]b t(1 G)
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Hawk and Sneaker but No Dove
The mixed ESS is , and hence the expected∗ ∗{p , 0, 1 p }
proportion of animals playing dove at equilibrium q∗ is
equal to 0 if when and the proportion ofW ! W qp 0D S
animals playing hawk is such that the expected gain of an
animal playing hawk equals that of an animal playing
sneaker. When the proportion of animals playing dove is
equal to 0, the condition is satisfied ifW p WH S
a Q
  Tc (t  T)p( )Z1 G 1 pG
a
 xT bc (t  T). (21)( )Z1 G
Solving equation (21) requires that the proportion of an-
imals playing hawk is p∗ with
c(b t) tx(1 G) N
∗p p , (22)
2Gtc
where .2Np 4ct(F a cb) [c(t b) tx(1 G)]
When the proportion of animals playing hawk and sneaker
are p∗ and , respectively, the expected gain of an∗1 p
animal playing dove is smaller than that of an animal
playing sneaker, provided that the cost of fighting is smaller
than the critical value , with∗c 8
∗p Gt a∗c p # x . (23)8 ( ) [ ]b t(1 G)
Hawk, Dove, and Sneaker
When the cost of fighting is but , the three strat-∗ ∗! c 1 c7 8
egies coexist within the population, and the expected pro-
portions of each strategy at equilibrium {p∗, q∗, r∗} satisfy
this condition: .W p W p WH D S
From these results, we can define the solution of the
game according to the loss of energy associated with fight-
ing c :
When and ∗, neither dove nor sneaker can∗c ! c c ! c5 6
invade a group in which all individuals play hawk and
the ESS is {1, 0, 0}.
When and/or , , and , hawk and∗ ∗ ∗ ∗c 1 c c 1 c c 1 c c 1 c5 6 7 8
dove coexist within the population and the ESS is
, with the expression of p∗ given by equa-∗ ∗{p , 1 p , 0}
tion (19).
When and/or , , and , hawk and∗ ∗ ∗ ∗c 1 c c 1 c c ! c c ! c5 6 7 8
sneaker coexist within the population and the ESS is
, with the expression of given∗ ∗ ∗ ∗{1 r , 0, r } p p 1 r
by equation (22).
When and/or , , and , hawk, dove,∗ ∗ ∗ ∗c 1 c c 1 c c ! c c 1 c5 6 7 8
and sneaker coexist within the population, and the fre-
quencies of each strategy at equilibrium {p∗, q∗, r∗} sat-
isfy .W p W p WH D S
Predictions
As above, the expected proportion of intruders playing
hawk can never decline to 0 and, of the three appropriation
strategies, only playing hawk can exist as a pure ESS. Thus,
once again, there is no condition in which group members
should share the resources without any sign of overt ag-
gression. However, by allowing sneakers to find their own
food, we now predict lower frequencies of hawk and hence
lower frequencies of aggressive interactions than in the
previous model. Another consequence of allowing sneak-
ers to find food is a narrower range of conditions under
which to expect the coexistence of all three appropriation
strategies (fig. 1B).
The likelihood of hawk being an ESS is again greatest
when groups are small (fig. 1B) because the time and
energetic costs of fighting are low. This prevents sneaker
or dove from invading a population of hawks. When the
number of competitors is large, in contrast, the time re-
quired to chase other competitors is increased, allowing
sneakers to obtain a larger fraction of the joiner’s share.
Increasing intruder number should therefore decrease the
frequency of hawk and increase the frequency of sneaker
(fig. 1B). As the frequency of playing hawk declines, how-
ever, so does the quantity of resource that can be gained
by playing sneaker. This means that, eventually, dove is
able to invade in large groups, particularly if clump density
is high (low t) and the frequency of sneakers decreases
with group size (fig. 1B).
Playing dove is most effective when hawk and sneaker
suffer large energetic costs of fighting, such that they are
unlikely to obtain sufficient resources to cover these costs.
Therefore, increasing c is predicted to increase the fre-
quency of dove (fig. 2B). As in the previous model, there
is little effect of the energetic cost of fighting on the fre-
quency of hawk.
Increasing the mean contest duration raises the quantity
of resource that can be gained by an animal playing sneaker
but decreases the resource available to victorious hawks
returning to the patch. We then predict, as in the above
version of the model (where sneakers could not find their
own resources), that increasing the mean contest duration
reduces the individuals’ level of aggressiveness but in-
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creases the frequency of sneaker (fig. 3B). In contrast to
the previous model, however, we now predict that the
frequency of dove should first increase and then decrease
rapidly as the mean contest duration increases (fig. 3B).
As in the previous model, the frequency of hawk and
sneaker should increase with increasing size of the joiner’s
share, whereas the frequency of dove is predicted to in-
crease as the finder’s advantage increases and to decrease
with increasing patch richness (fig. 4B). When food
patches are very rich or when the finder’s advantage is
very small, the benefits of aggressive appropriation are very
large in relation to the cost of fighting. Moreover, given
that the number of aggressive intruders is large under these
conditions, the time spent fighting is long, allowing sneak-
ers to obtain a large fraction of the joiner’s share. As the
patch richness decreases, in contrast, the benefits of ag-
gressive appropriation decrease, which in turn reduces the
success of the sneaker strategy. So decreasing the joiner’s
share should decrease the frequency of both hawk and
sneaker but increase the frequency of dove.
Discussion
The presence of the distraction sneaker strategy introduces
a number of important differences to games of resource
defense, compared with the usual two-strategy hawk-dove
games. Our three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game pre-
dicts lower proportions of hawk and hence lower fre-
quencies of aggressive interactions within groups com-
pared with previous two-strategy hawk-dove games (Sirot
2000; Dubois et al. 2003). Previous game-theoretic analyses
of aggression predict a large increase in the frequency of
aggressive individuals when the value of resources for
which animals compete is large because the energetic costs
of fighting become comparatively small (Sirot 2000; Du-
bois et al. 2003). Our analysis shows that if aggression
becomes common (hawks are numerous), the increasing
quantity of time spent chasing aggressive competitors of-
fers an opportunity for distraction sneakers to gain a large
portion of the finder’s share. As a consequence, the quan-
tity of energy that can be gained by the victorious ag-
gressive hawk becomes insufficient to cover its fighting
costs, leading to a reduced level of aggressiveness compared
to situations without the sneaker strategy. Sneakers there-
fore reduce the incidence of aggressive encounters by im-
posing an additional cost on the use of the escalated hawk
strategy. Allowing sneakers to search for undiscovered re-
sources and to appropriate resources uncovered by con-
specifics further reduces the expected frequency of ag-
gression within groups. Thus our model predicts that the
extent to which sneakers decrease the frequency of ag-
gression within groups will depend on their likelihood of
suffering an attack from a returning hawk and whether
searching for unchallenged resources and sneaking are
compatible activities. Given that escalated fighting has
been reported to be relatively uncommon in most species
(Enquist et al. 1990), our three-strategy model may pro-
vide a more realistic depiction of the economics of resource
defense than those of previous game-theoretic models
(Sirot 2000; Dubois et al. 2003). If we are correct, then
we predict that the existence and abundance of oppor-
tunities for distraction sneaking would predict the fre-
quency of aggression. For example, a resource that can be
carried by the owner will provide fewer sneaking oppor-
tunities and promote higher levels of aggression than
patches that are left unguarded during defense. Fulmars
(Fulmarus glacialis) may provide just such an example.
Large fish carcasses provide ample sneaking opportunities,
attract many birds, and promote scramble competition,
whereas smaller carcasses are carried and monopolized by
owners who engage in intense fights with intruders (En-
quist et al. 1985).
Our models predict that the proportion of animals that
avoid conflicts by leaving the resource (playing dove)
should be very low under most conditions. Given that the
expected proportion of hawk can never reach 0, playing
dove is ineffective in most circumstances because a dove
that faces an aggressive competitor always leaves all of the
remaining resource to the hawk without a fight and hence,
at best, can obtain only the finder’s advantage. An animal
that plays sneaker, in contrast, is not constrained to the
finder’s share but, rather, can take advantage of all re-
maining food while its owner is busy chasing away in-
truders. Sneakers, therefore, can do better than the dove
strategy, especially when the probability of being attacked
by a hawk is relatively low or when the energetic cost
resulting from an attack is relatively small. The ESS for
the game in these conditions is a combination of hawk
and sneaker players. However, given that animals playing
sneaker do not leave before the patch is totally depleted,
contrary to those playing dove, the likelihood that the three
strategies will coexist within the population is maximal
when food density is high because the time spent in fights
is then likely longer than the time required to uncover an
equivalent replacement food patch.
In an earlier two-strategy hawk-dove game adapted to
a group foraging scenario, Dubois et al. (2003) predicted
that an increase in the finder’s advantage should decrease
the expected proportion of hawks within groups because
the value of the remaining resource for which animals
compete becomes insufficient to cover the costs of fighting.
The three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game, in contrast,
predicts that the finder’s advantage should not have any
marked influence on the proportion of encounters re-
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sulting in aggression. This arises because increases in the
finder’s advantage give way to two opposing effects. In-
creasing the finder’s share reduces the benefits of fighting
because the remaining fraction of the patch is less likely
to be worth the fight. Increasing the finder’s advantage
also reduces the amount of food available to sneakers and
so leads to a reduction in the frequency of this tactic, which
increases the payoffs to aggression. These two opposing
forces mitigate the effect that the finder’s share can have
on the frequency of aggression when sneakers are present.
We expect therefore that factors that influence the finder’s
advantage will strongly affect the expected level of ag-
gression within groups only when distraction sneakers are
absent.
Simple two-strategy hawk-dove games (Sirot 2000; Du-
bois et al. 2003) predict that the frequency of aggression
should decrease as the energetic expenditure of contests
increases. Our three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game,
however, predicts little or no effect of the energetic costs
of fights on the expected frequency of aggression because
we assume that the cost of being attacked is the same as
the cost of fighting. Increasing the costs of aggression in-
creases the costs of fights but also increases benefits be-
cause less food is lost to sneakers as the cost of aggression
increases and sneakers switch to another tactic. The net
result is little to no effect of aggressive cost on the fre-
quency of fighting when sneakers are present.
Our model predicts that the proportion of aggressive
competitors and hence the proportion of encounters re-
sulting in aggression should decrease with increasing com-
petitor number. Observations of giant danio fish (Danio
aequipinnatus) defending a food patch (Chapman and
Kramer 1996) and male dung flies (Scatophaga stercoraria)
defending a cowpat (Borgia 1980) provide strong support
for this prediction. Two-strategy hawk-dove games predict
either that aggression should increase with competitor
number (Sirot 2000) or that it should reach a peak at
intermediate competitor densities in a group foraging con-
text (Dubois et al. 2003). Our game predicts a decline
because it assumes that all nonsneakers will converge on
every food discovery and aggressively challenge its owner.
The owner therefore faces an increase in the costs of fights
with an increase in group size such that the remaining
food becomes increasingly unlikely to be worth the fight.
We expect that if we had relaxed this assumption of all
nonsneakers systematically challenging the food discov-
erer, a dome-shaped relationship like the one predicted in
Dubois et al. (2003) would have been expected (see Grant
et al. 2000). It would therefore be useful for future games
to permit frequencies of challengers to vary according to
the payoffs expected from using this strategy. Because the
benefits of performing sneaking behavior depend on the
number of intruders and hence on the proportion of in-
dividuals playing scrounger, further extensions to this
model should take into account both aspects.
To simplify the analysis, we have assumed in this study
that animals do not differ in their fighting abilities and
are equally capable of detecting unchallenged resources.
Recent findings, however, suggest that almost all alter-
native phenotypes are due to alternative tactics within a
conditional strategy. In salmon mating systems, for in-
stance, small males usually employ a behavioral tactic that
involves sneaking, while larger males employ a behavioral
tactic that employs fighting. So adult salmon males choose
their behavioral tactics, fighting or sneaking, based on their
competitive fighting ability. Nevertheless, the same indi-
vidual may adopt both tactics at different times of life.
Research in several systems has demonstrated that the
points at which animals switch between alternative tactics
are sensitive to how ecological and demographic events
influence tactic fitness (Gross 1996). This indicates that
populations most often experience frequency-dependent
selection and condition-dependent selection simulta-
neously. As a consequence, assuming that individuals may
differ in their fighting ability would have probably changed
the expected level of aggression but not the qualitative
results of this study. For instance, we suspect that the
relative size of sneakers compared to hawks will be an
important variable influencing sneaker strategy. In salmon
mating systems, the ability of sneakers to court and mate
with females in the absence of a hawk (i.e., discover a
patch) probably increases with the relative body size of the
sneaker (Hutchings and Myers 1988). Similarly, the costs
of attack increase when sneakers are small compared to
hawks. In Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), sneakers at only
2% of the weight of adult males are often killed during
mating competition (Hutchings and Myers 1987). Because
sneakers are relatively larger in Pacific than in Atlantic
salmon, we would expect higher levels of aggression among
males in the former than in the latter. In both cases, how-
ever, we predict that sneaking behavior should become
more profitable than fighting behavior as densities increase
and male-male competition intensifies, selecting for a shift
of the critical body size to a larger one.
In conclusion, our game suggests that the presence of
distraction sneaking within groups will profoundly affect
the extent to which factors such as competitor density,
food abundance, and the costs of fights will affect the levels
of aggression within groups. Studies of resource defense
have been interested in characteristics that make a resource
defendable or not. Our study points to the potential for
sneaking as a major contributor to resource defense. It
may be profitable, therefore, to explore the characteristics
of resources that promote sneaking because this may be
a convenient way of predicting the extent of aggression
within groups.
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